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1. Recent Developments
Patrick H. Martin
CampanileProfessorof Mineral Law
.Director,Louisiana MineralLaw Institute
LSU Law Center
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
I. Introduction
As usual for this slot on the program, we have a rich variety of oilfield controvermies in the courts. We will survey what we can in the
confines of an hour. Brevity may be the soul of wit, as Polonius told
Claudius and Gertrude, but it necessitates distortion by
oversimplification of complex factual and legal issues. All of you who
may have been litigants in any of the cases discussed herein please bear
with me while I reduce your many months or even years of earnest effort
to simple fouinulations and then dispose of them with cavalier
indifference to the many equities I have slighted, omitted or mistaken.
Consider this hour then as a sort of Cliffs Notes to Louisiana oil-and gas
law of the preceding year. As is said of the Reduced Shakespeare
Company's per'ormance of 37 Shakespeare plays in a bit more than an
hour, this is oil and gas for the quick of mind and short of time.
II. Legacy Oil Field Site Litigation
Oil field contamination cases have received quite a bit of attention
at this program over the past five years. The ruling in Corbello v. Iowa
Production' has generated a mini-industry. The imagination
demonstrated by the plaintiff bar in developing damages is matched only
by the ingenuity of defense counsel in devising procedural strategies to
stave off and limit liabilities. The Louisiana legislature entered the fray
in 2006 with Act 312, codified at Title 30:29. An excellent panel
presentation took place last year introducing us to Act 312. This year we
have the first reported cases that' give us further guidance on the
relationship of Act 312 to the tort claims in the legacy litigation going on
around the state. And we have cases reporting other procedural and
prescription of claims rulings.
A. Act 312
Germany v. ConocoPhillips Co. (La.App. 3 Cir.)

2008 WL 585070 (La.App. 3 Cir.), 2007-1145 (La.App. 3 Cir.
3/5/08)
In Germany v. ConocoPhillips Co., plaintiffs brought suit against
four companies that were alleged to have contaminated their land by oil
and gas operations. The plaintiffs sought remediation as well as other
Corbello v. Iowa Production,La. 2002-0826, 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
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relief, including damages. All parties agreed that Act 312 was applicable
to the claims. What was disputed about Act 312 in this and in other cases
around the state was the procedure to implement Act 312. Defendant
ConocoPhillips contended that Act 312 provides a three-phase procedure
for remediation claims:
Phase 1) - The trial court or jury determines whether there is
environmental damage and who is legally responsible for that
damage.
Phase 2) - If the findings are affirmative, the trial court orders the
matter to be turned over to the Louisiana Department of Natural
Resources for remediation plan consideration and formulation.
Phase 3) - The trial court enters a judgment on the final
remediation plan and determines whether the plaintiff-landowners
have any claims for damage beyond that which is being addressed
by the final approved plan. Damage claims which exceed the
provisions of the remediation plan are then tried by the trial court or
a jury.
Au contraire, the plaintiffs said. They argued that there were only
two phases contemplated by Act 312:
Phase 1) - The traditional procedure of a trial before the trial court
or a jury which determines liability and damages.
Phase 2) - The Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
develops a remediation plan, which is submitted to the trial court for
approval.
The Third Circuit found the plaintiffs' procedure to be more
persuasive on the application of Act 312. The Court's starting point was
the statutory right to a jury trial in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
articles 1731 through 1814, and it rejected defendant's assertion that Act
312 superseded the prior statutory right. They noted that an unpublished
Fourth Circuit opinion had reached the same conclusion about procedure
as they were now adopting.2 The simpler procedure would promote
judicial efficiency and avoid piecemeal litigation, while under the three
phase interpretation "there would be two juries, two trials, and at least
two appeals, all which could result in conflicting rulings."

DuplantierFamily Partnershipv. BP Amoco, docket number 07-293 (La.App. 4
Cir. 5/16/07), 955 So.2d 763,writs denied, 07-1241, 07-1265, 07-1271 (La.9/28/07), 964
So.2d 367, 368.
2
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Brownell Land Co., L.L.C. v. OXY USA Inc. (E.D.La.)
2007 WL 1695195 (E.D.La.), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41975; 2007
WL 2900486 (E.D.La.), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73946; 2007 WL
3138638 (E.D.La.); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77146; 2007 WL
3046203 (E.D.La.), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76743.
The plaintiff property owner in Brownell Land Co., L.L.C. v. OXY
USA Inc. brought a claim against the lessee-operator of six wells on the
property, seeking punitive damages under Civil Code article 2315.3 for
"the defendant's wanton or reckless disregard for public safety in the
storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances."
The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings and for summary
judgment. The motions were granted. 2007 WL 1695195, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 41975. Article 2315.3 went into effect September 4, 1984
and was repealed April 16, 1996. The last of the six wells was plugged
and abandoned on April 4, 1984, and defendant's activities were outside
the applicability of the statute. The court in the next report, 2007 WL
2900486 (E.D.La.), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73946, denied plaintiffs
motion to recorsider, holding that defendant did not have control of the
hazardous or toxic substance as required under the article,
notwithstanding the fact that the lease remained in effect.
In the nexi; matter, reported at 2007 WL 3138638 (E.D.La.), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEX]S 77146, the defendant moved for summary judgment on
the issue of prescription. Because the lease terminated in 1990, a fact
clear from the face of the petition, the court rejected plaintiff's argument
that the defendant had the burden of proving prescription. However, the
court ultimately denied the defendant's motion, finding that there was an
issue of material fact as to the knowledge of the plaintiff of the damage
as it related to the applicability of the doctrine of contra non valentem.
In the final decision to consider here, 2007 WL 3046203 (E.D.La.),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76743, the court denied the defendant's motion
in limine to exclude testimony and evidence regarding the need for,
extent and cost of plaintiff's proposed remediation plan. The opinion
addressed the operation of Act 312 of 2006. The court rejected the
defendant's reading of the statute that there is to be a trial on liability and
only after the tr al on liability can there be a trial on damages. Instead the
court adopts the reasoning that a jury will determine liability, and will
also determine the appropriate damages award. Afterwards, the DNR
will come up with a remediation plan.
M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (W.D. La.)
2007 WL 2081008 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60436, July
10, 2007; edopted by, remanded 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52401 July

18, 2007).
In MJ. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., landowners filed suit in
state court on April 27, 2006 alleging damages from defendants' failure
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to restore plaintiffs property after oilfield operations. The defendants
sought to invoke Act 312 of 2006 and the plaintiffs then asserted that if
the Act applied, it would violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
Evidently the district court declared Act 312 to be unconstitutional,
whereupon the State of Louisiana, through the Attorney General and
Exxon Mobil Corporation, invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the
Louisiana Supreme Court pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 5(D). The issue
of constitutionality was first raised in plaintiffs "Memorandum in
Opposition to Motions to Enforce Stay Provision of Act 312"; however,
a memorandum is not a pleading recognized under the Code of Civil
Procedure and was therefore not a proper method to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded to the district court to allow plaintiffs to specially plead
the unconstitutionality of Act 312. The defendants sought to remove to
federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. The magistrate
judge recommended that the plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court
be granted; the plaintiffs' claims did not arise under federal law and there
was thus no federal jurisdiction. The federal district judge determined
that the magistrate's findings and recommendation were correct and
remanded to the state district court.4
B. Joinder, Diversity, Prescription & contra non, Standing
Gaspard One, L.L.C. v. B P America Production Co. (W.D.La.)
2008 WL 465813 (W.D.La.)
The plaintiffs in Gaspard One, L.L.C. v. BP America Production
Co. brought their claim in state court in August 2007 against BP
America, Pan American Petroleum and also against two agencies of the
State of Louisiana, the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), and
the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). A few weeks later the
corporate defendants removed the suit to federal court based on diversity
of citizenship. The plaintiffs opposed this, saying they had alleged tort
claims against the state agencies and these could only be adjudicated in
state court. The magistrate judge concluded that the facts alleged by
plaintiffs were insufficient to assert a valid claim against the state, so
joinder of the agencies was improper and thus the matter could proceed
in federal court without remand.

3

M J. Farms, LTD. v Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-0450 (La. 04/27/2007); 956 So. 2d

573.
MJ Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007 WL 2081008 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 60436, July 10, 2007; adopted by, remanded by M. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52401 (W.D. La., July 18, 2007).

4
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Lejeune Bros., Inc. v. Goodrich Pet. Co. L.L.C. (La.App. 3 Cir.)
2007 WL 4178946, 2006-1557 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/28/07); 2007 La.
App. LEXIS 2132.
In Lejeune 3rothers, Inc. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., plaintiff
property owner brought an action against a company that operated an oil
and gas well under a mineral lease with the property owner's ancestor in
title, alleging contractual and tort claims related to property damage and
contamination resulting from oilfield production and production waste,
seeking restoration. Prior to the time the plaintiff acquired the property,
the mineral lease :,ad expired. The plaintiff's acquisition was subject to a
reservation of one -halfthe minerals to the seller.
The trial cout granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
oil company on the grounds that plaintiff did not have any contractual
damages; it was not an assignee or successor of any rights under the
mineral lease and the contract did not create a stipulationpour autrui in
favor of plaintiff. The plaintiff did not offer evidence of unreasonable or
excessive use required to trigger Mineral Code Article 122. Any claim
for damages belonged to plaintiffs ancestor in title, which he did not
convey to plaintiff in the sale of the property.
On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that plaintiff
did not have a contractual damage claim because he did not, and could
not, acquire an interest in the expired mineral lease because it had
terminated by the time of the sale. Furthermore, the court noted that the
language in the lease making the lessee responsible "for damage of the
lessor" did not create a valid stipulationpour autrui in favor of plaintiff.5
The court also found that plaintiff did not have a right of action to
bring a tort claim for damage to the property; the right to assert such a
claim is a personal right, belonging to the owner of the property at the
time of the damages, and it is not transferred by a mere transfer of title.
The court rejected plaintiffs allegation that the damage was a continuing
tort. The tortious conduct ended when the waste was dumped, regardless
of continuing damage. Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs claim that
Act 1166 of 2003 empowers landowners to sue for damages to usable

s
The court distinguished Hazelwood Farm, Inc. v. Liberty Oil and Gas Corp., 022616 (La.App. 3 Cir. 42/03), 844 So.2d 380, writs denied,03-1585 (La.10/31/03), 857
So.2d 476 and 03-1624 (La.10/31/03), 857 So.2d 476, Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co.,
255 La. 347, 231 So.2c 347 (1969), and Hargroderv. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.,
290 So.2d 874 (La. 1974). In both Hazelwood Farm and Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling
Co., 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 347 (1969), the clause in question made the lessee
responsible for all damages, not just the damages caused to the lessor. In Hargroderit
was specified in the agreement that the defendant would pay for damages "which may
arise to growing crops" so that the intent to pay for crop damage was considered beyond
question. See also Minvielle, LLC v. Atlantic Refining Co., infra.
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2008
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ground water, citing the statute's clear language that states, "[it] shall not
be interpreted to create any cause of action."
Kling Realty Co., Inc. v. ' Texaco, Inc. (W.D.La.)
2007 WL 81665 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1680; 2007 WL
2693855 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67064; 2007 WL
4553611 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94322.
In Kling Realty Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., lessors brought suit in state
court seeking damages from defendant lessee alleging their property had
been contaminated or otherwise damaged by the oil and gas activities,
including exploration and production, conducted or controlled by one or
more of the defendants. The dofendant lessee removed the case to federal
court based on diversity of citizenship. The plaintiffs sought remand to
state court. The defendant lessee claimed that the citizenship of two of
the defendants should be ignored because they were joined for the sole
purpose of defeating diversity. In an opinion of January 8, 2007, the
district court held that defendant met the burden of establishing that there
was no possibility that plaintiffs could maintain a cause of action against
either of the two identified defendants. 6 The motion to remand was thus
denied.
The defendants moved for partial summary judgment based on a
valid release of liability, executed in 1973, and, alternatively,
prescription. The Louisiana Civil Code articles governing transaction and
compromise are set forth in Articles 3071 through 3083. In an opinion of
September 11, 2007, the district court denied defendants' motion with
respect to transaction and compromise, finding that there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the release included the area
immediately surrounding the wells or the additional property where the
contamination was located.7 The court noted that there is a
jurisprudential exception to the extrinsic evidence rule for compromise
agreements. Under this exception, proof of the scope of a release can
include extrinsic evidence; the Louisiana courts generally interpret a
contract from its four corners, but they have crafted a special exception
to the extrinsic evidence rule for compromise agreements.! The court
found that the plaintiffs had submitted evidence to support their
assertions that they did not intend to release the claims they now alleged
for permanent contamination; the evidence submitted was the type of
substantiating evidence that the exception addresses.
6

Kling Realty Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 WL 81665 (W.D.La.); 2007

LEXIS 1680.

U.S.

Dist.

7
Kling Realty Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 WL 2693855 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 67064.
8
See Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 445 (5th Cir. 2002); Brown v. Drillers,
Inc., 630 So. 2d 741, 747 (La. 1994).
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The court addressed the claim. of prescription in an opinion of
December 18, 2007.9 In this decision, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the doctrine of contra non valentem applied. The liberative
prescriptive perio i for torts of one year under Civil Code article 3492
begins to run from the day an injury or damage is sustained; however,
damage is considered to have been sustained only when it has manifested
itself with sufficient certainty to support accrual of a cause of action.' 0
There was knowledge of the damage, evidenced by an affidavit stating
that the land was unable to sustain crop growth around the well area
though the affiant had tried to plant sugar cane near the well site every
three years from the early 1970s until 2006; the president of a plaintiff
business entity expressed concern with damage to the land in letters of
1971; and the plaintiffs presented no evidence that the defendants
concealed increasing contamination after plaintiffs and/or their
predecessors in interest executed the release.
Furthermore, the court noted that the longer ten-year prescriptive
period for breach of the mineral lease had prescribed thirteen years after
the release was executed where the release provided that the crops would
return to normal three years after the release date. Finally, the court
rejected plaintiffs' claim that the contamination was the result of a
continuing tort, finding that the defendant's last tortious act occurred on
the day the release was executed. The plaintiffs fared no better with an
argument that their claim could proceed as one for breach of contract
governed by a ten year prescriptive period under Civil Code Article
3499. The lease would expired on October 22, 1971, if one looked to the
date of plugging nd abandonment of the well; even if the lease was
maintained until the final release was recorded on August 20, 1974,
plaintiffs' contractual claim prescribed on August 20, 1984.
Minvielle, LLC v. Atlantic Refining Co. (W.D.La.)
2007 WL 2668715 (W.D.La.), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65981.
The plaintiff landowner in Frank C. Minvielle, L.L.C. v. IMC
Global Operations, Inc.," brought a claim for damages resulting from
contamination against several oil and gas companies that had operated on
the land prior to the acquisition of the land by plaintiff. In that suit, the
district court dism:.ssed the plaintiffs claim for lack of standing, finding
that the plaintiff he.d not acquired the previous owner's right to sue in the
cash sale of the land, and that any tort occurred prior to his acquisition of
the land. The plaintiff then obtained an amendment to the cash sale of the
9

Kling Realty Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 WL 4553611 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 94322.
1o
"1

Cole v. Celotex Corp., 620 So.2d 1154, 1156 (La.1993).
Frank C. Minvielle, L.L.C. v. IMC Global Operations, Inc., 380 F.Supp.2d 755

(W.D.La.2004) (Minviolle 1).
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land, conveying the right to sue, and filed the instant suit, Minvielle, LLC
v. Atlantic Refining Co.12
The defendants moved for summary judgment on various grounds
including res judicata.The court granted the motion, applying Louisiana
law and finding that the dismissal for lack of standing was jurisdictional,
res judicata applies to a judgment dismissing a claim for lack of such
jurisdiction, and plaintiffs after the fact creation of a document
purporting to create standing does not alter the resjudicataeffect.
III. Contracts Law 101.
Baker Hughes Oilfield Operation v. Flash Gas & Oil Southwest,
Inc. (W.D.La.)
2007 WL 1551057; 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43007 (W.D.La.)
This case arose from a claim of nonpayment of money owed for
goods, equipment, supplies, and services that plaintiff furnished in
connection with the drilling and/or operation of certain wells located on a
lease operated by defendant. The defendant filed a counterclaim alleging
damage to a well due to improperly set packers that resulted in
diminished well flow rates. The plaintiff then moved to dismiss the
prayer for damages for loss of production on the grounds that the Terms
and Conditions provision (which contained a waiver of consequential
damages clause) of the contract in force between the parties did not allow
for recovery of this type of damages. In this decision, the plaintiffs
motion for partial summary judgment on the defendant's counterclaim
was denied. The case at this report was a text-book case of an offer and
acceptance controversy as to whether an email containing the Terms and
Conditions provision was received by the counter-claimant, Flash.
Louisiana Civil Code Articlel927 governed, and it requires both offer
and acceptance to establish a contract. The Court found that the
circumstances did not clearly indicate that Flash intended to accept or
otherwise consent to Baker Hughes' Terms and Conditions, and so
summary judgment was not available.
Burlington Resources, Inc. v. United National Ins. Co. (E.D.La.)
481 F.Supp.2d 567 (E.D.La., 2007).
The court in Burlington Resources, Inc. v. United National Ins.
3
Co.1 gave effect to a provision of a joint operating agreement that stated:
[Operator] shall conduct and direct and have full control of all
operations on the Contract Area as permitted and required by, and
within the limits of this agreement. In its performance of services
12

Minvielle, LLC v. Atlantic Refining Co., 2007 WL 2668715 (W.D.La.), 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 65981. (Minvielle
1

II).

Burlington Resources, Inc. v. United National Ins. Co., 481 F.Supp.2d 567

(E.D.La. 2007).
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hereunder for the Non-Operators [Burlington], Operator shall be an
independent contractor not subject to the control or direction of the
Non-Operators except as to the type of operation to be undertaken
in accordance with the election procedures contained in the
agreement. Operator shall not be deemed, or hold itself out as, the
agent of the Non-Operators with authority to bind them to any
obligation or liability assumed or incurred by Operator as to any
third party. [emphasis by court].
The court noted that "Louisiana law holds that a non-operator
without supervisory powers bears no responsibility to third parties for
claims arising out of negligent operation of a drill site." Hence, a
payment by the nonoperator to the operator was under the joint operating
agreement, not fbr plaintiffs own liability for negligence in the blowout,
and the insurer was liable to the nonoperator under its excess liability
coverage.
Haspel & Davis Milling & Planting Co. Ltd. v. Board of Levee
Commissioners and State of Louisiana (U.S.C.A. 5)
493 F.3d 570
The case of Haspel & Davis Milling & PlantingCo. Ltd. v. Board of
Levee Commisaioners of the Orleans Levee Dist. and State of
Louisiana,14 is one of a number of proceedings arising out of the
protracted controversy over the Bohemia Spillway. In 1984 the Louisiana
legislature directed the Levee Board to return the land to its former
owners and to "provide a thorough accounting . . . concerning all

revenues receivd from the affected property." The Levee Board gave
quitclaim deeds to the landowners but did not pay mineral royalties that
accrued between 1984 and the return of the lands. After 12 years of
litigation over these accrued funds, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement. When the Levee Board failed to make certain payments
under the settlement, the plaintiffs brought this suit, asserting that the
failure to pay was an unconstitutional taking of their property. The
district court agreed with them that the Levee Board's intentional failure
to satisfy the state court judgment constituted a violation of the Takings
Clause, awarding them $17,442,332.96, plus unquantified prejudgment
interest, post-judgment interest, costs, and attorneys' fees.
On appeal, the Levee Board argued successfully that because of the
settlement agreement, the plaintiffs' claim was for breach of a contract,
not a taking. A provision in the Settlement Agreement stated that if the
Levee Board faied to pay at least $2,600,000 per year, the landowners
could exercise their rights to enforce the Consent Judgment "in
accordance with this Agreement and law." The Levee Board in fact did
Haspel & Davis Milling & Planting Co. Ltd. v. Board of Levee Commissioners of
the Orleans Levee Dst. and State ofLouisiana, 493 F.3d 570 (C.A.5 (La.).
1
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not pay the requisite $2,600,000 per year. But under the terms of the
Settlement Agreement, the Consent Judgment was to be paid only "as
and if funds are appropriated thereof." The Settlement Agreement
contained no provision providing that the agreement was rendered
invalid if the Levee Board failed to pay the yearly $2,600,000. Instead,
the Consent Judgment specifically stated that the state court was to retain
jurisdiction over the matter "for the purpose of effectuating, enforcing
and implementing" its judgment. The landowners had compromised their
takings claim against the Levee Board. That extinguished any takings
claim they may have had, so their only legal recourse was to enforce
their rights under the Settlement Agreement and Consent Judgment.
Martin v. JKD Investments, LLC (La.App. 2 Cir.)
961 So.2d 575, 42,196 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/20/07).
Plaintiff borrowed money from a bank to finance home construction
on a 52 acre tract he had inherited. A short time later his sister conveyed
her interest in the tract to him, a7- on the same day he signed a document
that conveyed his mineral rights in the tract for $3,000 to JKD
Investments, which was owned and operated by an officer and employee
of the bank financing the home construction. About four years later,
plaintiff learned the import of the deed and that the mineral rights to his
tract were owned by the banker. He then sought rescission of the
conveyance plus damages, alleging that he had been defrauded. He
alleged that, contrary to the three affidavits put forth by defendants, he
did not sign the mineral deed in the presence of any witnesses or a notary
public. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, which
was upheld on appeal to the Second Circuit. The claim that the plaintiff
never read the mineral deed negated the possibility of his being
defrauded by defendants. The court said that plaintiff s:
unsubstantiated claim that he and [the banker] were alone when he
signed the mineral deed, as opposed to having the witnesses and
notary public present, is not a material fact in that its existence or
nonexistence is not essential to plaintiffs cause of action under the
applicable theory of recovery.... A transfer of immovable property
must be made by authentic act or by act under private signature. La.
C.C. art. 1839. Any party against whom an act under private
signature is asserted must acknowledge his signature or deny that it
is his. La. C.C. art. 1838. As noted above, during his deposition,
[plaintiff] acknowledged that the signature on the mineral deed is
his. This acknowledgment renders the factual dispute over whether
two witnesses and a notary were present immaterial, since iii one
scenario the transfer was made by authentic act and in the other
scenario the transfer was made by act under private signature. Under
both scenarios the transfer was valid.
Summary judgment for defendants was properly granted.

https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol55/iss1/5
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Schexnayder v. Gish (La.App. 2 Cir.)
948 So.2d :259, 41,819 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/7/07)
Plaintiffs, who were not licensed real estate brokers, entered into a
consultation agreement with defendants to find a buyer for certain
property. After plaintiffs found a buyer the defendants refused to pay the
agreed fee, asserting that the plaintiffs were not licensed real estate
brokers.' 5 The trial court sustained the defendants' exception on this
basis. The cour: of appeals here ruled that while the plaintiffs may be
precluded from most recovery under the consultation agreement for lack
of a license, they should be given an opportunity to amend their petition
to allow them to seek recovery for the portion of the fee that would be
attributable to the sale of oil, gas, and other mineral interests, the
brokerage of which does not require a real estate license by the Louisiana
Real Estate Commission.
CLK Company, L.L.C. v. CXY Energy, Inc. (La.App. 3 Cir.)
972 So.2d :1280, 2007-834 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/19/07).
In CLK Company, L.L.C. v. CXY Energy, Inc., a consulting firm
generating drilling prospects brought a claim for breach of contract after
contracting with Nexen, an oil and gas company, to provide seismic and
geophysical da:a to Nexen in exchange for an assignment of an
overriding royalty if Nexen acquired an interest in certain property
within one year. Nexen acquired a State lease over the property within
the one year term, but later released the lease and entered into an
operating agreement outside of the one year period. Nexen stipulated that
it was required to assign an overriding royalty on the lease, because it
was acquired within the year, but did not assign an overriding royalty to
CLK with respect to the operating agreement, contending that it was
acquired outside of the one year period and the contract requiring the
assignment did not contain a "renewal or extension clause."
The court affirmed the trial court's finding that the language
requiring Nexen to "assign" an overriding royalty was ambiguous,
because the contract did not define the term, and the jury's conclusion
that the parties :.ntended to include a renewal and extension clause after
hearing extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent; the evidence
established that, pursuant to industry custom, any assignment of an
overriding royalty interest would have included an extension or renewal
clause. The court denied CLK's request for double damages under
Mineral Code Article 212.23,6 finding that a letter requesting an

IS La. R.S. 37:1445 provides that unlicensed persons cannot recover brokerage
charges.
16
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 31:212.23.
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assignment of an overriding royalty did not make a demand for payment
of a royalty as required by the article.' 7
Dor6 Energy Corp. v. Prospective Inv. & Trading Co., Ltd.
(W.D.La.)
2007 WL 2736613 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69037.
In Dord Energy, a landowner filed suit against mineral lessees
requesting cancellation of the lease for failure to explore and develop
properly a portion of the property. The parties entered into a settlement
of the suit which released certain areas from the lease that were not in
"producing units" after three years from the date of the settlement. In
those three years the defendants did not establish a voluntary or a
Commissioner's unit. Dor6 filed suit to enforce the settlement agreement
and moved for summary judgment.
The court granted Dord's motion, finding the language of the
settlement unambiguous. The technical term "producing units" is defined
in Louisiana law as voluntary or Commissioner's units, said the court,
and it rejected defendant's argument that the settlement agreement,
which limited the size of any unit created around a producing well to 160
acres, automatically created 160 acre units around such wells.
In a subsequent ruling in the same case, the court denied a motion
by defendant to dismiss the claim for failure to join indispensable parties,
certain overriding royalty owners.' 8 The party had failed to raise the
issue in a timely fashion.
Phoenix Assoc. Land Syndicate, Inc. v. E.H. Mitchell & Co.,
L.L.C. (La.App. 1 Cir.)
970 So. 2d 605, 2007-0108 (La.App. I Cir. 9/14/07).
In Phoenix Assoc. Land Syndicate, Inc. v. E.H. Mitchell & Co.,
L.L.C,19 a lessee of sand and gravel rights brought a claim against the
landowner alleging breach of lease. The landowner reconvened seeking
cancellation of the lease because the lessee violated the terms of the lease
requiring the landowner's consent to sublease. Phoenix had entered into
an arrangement with two other parties who would remove the sand and
gravel, and it argued that the arrangement was an operating agreement
and not a sublease.
Because only one case involving La.R.S. 31:212.21-23 has been reported and was
inapplicable, the court considered jurisprudence under La.R.S. 31:137, which addresses
the notice a mineral lessor must give its lessee before filing suit for royaltiep. See
Rebstock v. Birthright Oil & Gas Co., 406 So.2d 636 (La.App. I Cir.), writ denied,407
So.2d 742 (La.198 1),
is
Dord Energy Corp. v. Prospective Inv. & Trading Co., Ltd., 2008 WL 152119
(W.D.La.).
19
Phoenix Assoc. Land Syndicate, Inc. v. E.H. Mitchell & Co., L.L.C., 970 So. 2d
605, 2007-0108 (La.App. I Cir. 9/14/07).
17
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The court found that the "operating agreement" was in fact a
sublease. Phocnix had conveyed the ownership of minerals to the third
party; when the third parties reduced them to possession it had sub-let its
lease rights. The court rejected Phoenix's argument that its
characterization of the agreement as an "operating agreement" with the
third parties made the contract an "operating agreement" rather than a
sublease. The court said that the intent of the parties to the "operating
agreements" could not determine the character of the operating
agreements because "the legal character of a contract must be determined
by its substance, by its effect on the parties, what the law-not the
parties-says it is; so the parties' intent is not conclusive.... The rights
of third persons are controlled by the substance, rather than the title, of
the contractual relationship between the parties." Furthermore, the court
noted that th-. purported "operating agreement" had impermissibly
dismembered the landowner's ownership by conveying more rights to
use the properly to the third party than had been originally granted in the
lease from the landowner. The appeals court affirmed the dissolution of
the subject lea:;es.
Sporting Land, L.L.C. v. CHC Energy, L.L.C. (W.D.La.)
2007 WL 4124537 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85373.
In SportingLand, L.L. C v. CHC Energy, L.L. C., the court issued an
injunction requiring defendant mineral lessee to cease operations during
the water fowl hunting season as required by a surface use easement. The
land was in Fichland Parish. When Sporting Land purchased it from
Tensas Delta Exploration, the latter reserved mineral rights. CHC Energy
subsequently took a lease from Tensas Delta to develop coal-bed
methane gas. ?laintiff brought the suit to enforce the surface easement
restrictions. Among the facts noted by the court, the property is hunted
for ducks in the morning and deer in the afternoon. Sporting Land leases
blinds for duck hunting, but lessees are not allowed to hunt nor ride
ATVs or mules in the afternoon. This requirement allows the ducks a
chance to rest, so that they will not leave the property. Is the disturbance
of hunting an irreparable injury justifying the extraordinary remedy of an
injunction? Yes indeed, held the court. The mineral lessee would be
allowed to check its wells to avoid salt water contamination, but it had to
do so at a time and in a manner calculated to minimize any impact on
hunting activities.
IV. Unit Relations - Well Costs & Royalty
Two cases explore the nature of the relations of parties in a
compulsory ur.it. Units created by the state have impacts on the contract
relations of working interest owners included in the units and their
royalty owners. 20
20

See generally, B. Kramer & P. Martin, Pooling and Unitization,

§§ 13.08, 19.03
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Gulf Explorer v. Clayton Williams Energy (La.App. 1 Cir.)
964 So.2d 1042, 2006-1949 (La.App. I Cir. 6/8/07)
In GulfExplorer v. Clayton Williams Energy,2 1 the defendant drilled
a well on a unit created by the Commissioner of Conservation after
giving notice to the plaintiff non-operator. The plaintiff did not elect to
participate in the well. The well produced $3.6 million in revenues but
did not achieve payout ($4.9 million). The plaintiff, a working interest
owner, sought royalty and overriding royalty on the $3.6 million in
revenue. The defendant operator sought a declaration that it was entitled
to recover the plaintiff leaseholder's allocable share of expenditures
related to the well unit. The court held that plaintiff had no contract with
the defendant, and under the statute the defendant had no duty to pay
royalty to plaintiff or to plaintiffs overriding royalty owners. The result
here flows from the principles followed in Willis v. InternationalOil &
Gas Corp.22 Applying the Louisiana Civil Code 23 and prior case law 24 the
Willis court held the drilling cotenant was entitled to a set-off for the pro
rata share of expenses not being paid by the non-drilling cotenant.
Louisiana follows a "tract allocation" approach to unitization. Under this,
it is the working interest on a tract that is subject to compulsory pooling,
and the production is allocated back to the tract in the unit. The workinginterest owner as to that tract then bears the responsibility for payment of
royalty under its contract of lease.25

(2007).
21

Gulf Explorer v. Clayton Williams Energy, 964 So.2d 1042, 2006-1949 (La.App. I

Cir. 6/8/07).
22

Willis v. InternationalOil & Gas Corp., 541 So. 2d 332 (La. App. 1989). See also

Shanks v. Exxon Corp., 674 So. 2d 473, 95-2164 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996), discussed
below.
23
La. Civ. Code art. 488.
24
Huckabay v. Texas Co., 227 La. 191, 78 So. 2d 829.
25

Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest NaturalProduction Co., 221 La. 608, 60

So. 2d 9 (1952). The plaintiff claimed that the drilling unit (pooling) order of the
Commissioner of Conservation converted the mineral ownership in the entire unit such
that every royalty owner was given a definite interest in each and every foot of gas and
every barrel of distillate produced from the well and not merely in that portion allocated
to the tract in which the owner had an interest. The court rejected this theory, holding
instead for the theory that the unitization by the commissioner "has no other effect than to
allocate to each tract its pro rata share of the production from the entire unit;
consequently, that the lessees of the tracts contained in the this unit are obligated to
account to their royalty owners only on the basis of the proceeds realized by them from
the marketing of the production thus allocated to the tract, and in accordance with the
terms of the individual lease contracts existing between the respective lessors and
lessees." 60 So. 2d at 10.

-
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Shanks v. Exxon Corp. (La.App. 1 Cir.)
2007-08!2 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/21/07), 2007 WL 4463480; 2007 La.
App. LEXIS 2299
Shanks v. Exxon Corp.26 is a follow-up to an earlier phase of
litigation under the same name. 27 It proceeds from the same sorts of
issues as in Gulf Explorer. In Shanks, four leases with ten-year primary
terms were granted in 1976 to X. Later that same year X conveyed a V2
interest in the leases to Y and the remaining V2 interest to Z. In 1981, all
or portions oi the tracts were included in a unit for a well drilled on
adjacent or nearby land by another oil company, defendant Exxon. In
1985, produclion from the unit well began to be marketed. Exxon, the
operator, paid royalties to the plaintiffs and withheld from the plaintiffs'
lessee (sublessee) the monthly proceeds of unit production attributable to
that leasehold interest in order to recover well costs Exxon had
previously incurred. Because of a belief that the well would never pay
out, the plaintiffs' lessee's sublessee released all of its interest in the
leases. This nieant the plaintiffs were now unleased owners. Thereafter,
Exxon continued to withhold the proceeds of production to recover the
remaining unpaid well costs ($14,066,590.30). After payout was
achieved in Cctober 1989, plaintiffs were paid their proportionate share
of production less their share of operating costs. The plaintiffs then filed
suit seeking a declaratory judgment, declaring that Exxon, and the
original lessee and sublessee, in solido, were liable for well costs
incurred prior to the date the sublessee released its interests in the leases,
and for a monetary judgment in their favor for the amount of each
plaintiffs share of unit production withheld by Exxon after the release of
the leases for recoupment of well costs. In the initial phase of this
litigation, because the principal defendant in this matter was Y's
assignee, all of the parties agreed to sever their claims against the
operator and against X, the original lessee/sublessor, both as to the
original claim and the incidental claims.
The court in the 1996 opinion held that an oil and gas lessee (the
defendant then being the sublesgee) who releases the lease is thereby
relieved of responsibility to the lessor for well costs previously accrued.
The defendant sublessee's liability for well costs attributable to a well
drilled on someone else's land was not necessarily created by virtue of
the leases. Rather, the unitization order, including the leased tracts at
issue or porti ns thereof in the compulsory unit, affected the working
interest owner's obligation for well costs as an "owner" of a tract
included within the unit. Following the ruling in Davis Oil Company v.
Shankg v. Exxon Corp., 2007 0852 (La.App. I Cir. 12/21/07), 2007 WL 4463480;
2007 La. App. LEXIS 2299.
27
La. App. 95i-2164, 674 So. 2d 473 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996).
26
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2 8 the 1996 court stated that
Steamboat Petroleum Corporation,
a nonoperating owner or lessee who does not consent to operations within a
compulsory drilling unit by a unit operator has no liability for the costs
of development and operations, except out of his share of production.
The liability of a non-consenting, non-operating owner for well costs
only arises as there is production. The working interest owner's liability
for well costs accrued only as there was production from the unit well
and only to the extent of its proportionate share of production. That
working interest owner's entire proportionate share of production was
applied to the payment of well costs during the existence of the leases.
Thus, the sublessee had paid all well costs for which it was liable by law.
The 2007 decision now took up the plaintiffs' claim against X, the
original lessee. The plaintiffs now asserted that even though the release
of the lease by the sublessee may have been effective to terminate its
liabilities under the sublease, the lease obligations of X continued to
apply and that insofar as X was concerned the well costs were fully
accrued when they were incurred by the operator. The plaintiffs looked
to article 129 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, which provides a lessee "is
not relieved of his obligations or liabilities under a mineral lease unless
the lessor has discharged him expressly and in writing." 29 The plaintiffs'
position would perhaps have merit if the effect of the release by Y was
effective only as to the sublease. However, the sublessee had power to
release the lease and this terminated the liability of the lessee under the
lease. The well costs had no more accrued to X than they had to Y, hence
no liability of X either. A contrary ruling would require post termination
enforcement of the released leases as to the X's responsibility for drilling
costs, but would treat as released or terminated X's contractual right to
seven-eighths of production. The court said this would be a proposition

of "Heads - I win - Tails - you lose."

V. Prescription of Limited Term Mineral Servitudes
Mineral servitudes and mineral royalties in Louisiana are subject to
a regime of liberative prescription. This is similar to the common law
concept of abandonment but has the added merit of a precise period for
determining non-use and requires no demonstration of an intent to
abandon.30 A similar approach is now followed in states enacting
dormant mineral interest acts.3 1 Question may arise as to whe 'ier the
parties have established a fixed term of ten years or less for a mineral
right or have specified a prescriptive period under the Mineral Code.
583 So. 2d 1139, 1142, 113 O.&G.R. 98 (La. 1991).
LSA-R.S. 31:129.
30
See Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 442 P.2d 692 (1968).
31
These are referenced and discussed in Pat Martin & Bruce Kramer, Williams &
Meyers Oil and Gas Law §215 (2007).
28

29
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St. Mary Operating Co. v. Champagne (La App. 3 Cir.)
945 So.2d 846, 2006-984 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/06)
In St. Mary Operating Co. v. Champagne,32 St. Mary Operating
Company filed a concursus proceeding in order to determine to whom it
should pay the proceeds of an oil well. One group was made up
landowners who asserted that a deed reserving mineral rights had created
a right subject to a fixed term of ten years. The mineral owners claimed
that the ten year period specified in the deed merely invoked the regime
of prescription and that the rights could be preserved by actions that
interrupted prescription. Both were looking to the deed which provided:
"Vendors reserre unto themselves all of the minerals underlying or
which may be produced from the above described tracts for a period of
ten years, . . ." 'he trial court granted summary judgment for the current
owners of the land, ruling that the language in the cash sale deed of 1993
created a ten-year fixed term mineral servitude, as opposed to a mineral
servitude subject to the rules of prescription. The owners of mineral
rights appealec. The appeals court reversed. Because all mineral
servitudes create.d in Louisiana are subject to the rules of prescription,
and because the parties did not specifically state in the cash sale deed
that the reservec ten-year period was for a fixed term and was not subject
to the rules of prescription, the appeals court reversed and granted the
motion for sumrmary judgment submitted by the servitude owners. The
court also ruled that the mineral rights reserved were a mineral servitude
rather than a mineral royalty.
There are several aspects of the decision in this case that one might
question. The starting point -of analysis is the intent of the parties in
creating the mineral right at issue. Did the parties intend to create a
mineral right with a fixed term of ten years or did they intend to create a
mineral right that could last indefinitely so long as the prescription of ten
years is interrupted? In Louisiana the parties can create either. To this
writer the deed looks like it is a reservation for an explicit fixed term. To
conclude otherwise, the court uses two interpretive rules. The court notes
that the language was chosen by the landowners and resolves such
ambiguity as there may be against the drafter. Second, the court looks to
the comments to Article 74 of the Mineral Code, asserting that "if a party
wants to creatc: a term and deny the benefit of the interruption of
prescription, that intention must be specified." This may not be an
accurate characterization of the comment, particularly if as it seems the
court is drawing on the comment sentence that states: "In the event of
silence as to the term of a mineral servitude, the right created is
permanent or perpetual, but it is subject to loss by accrual of the
St. Mary Operating Co. v. Champagne, 945 So.2d 846, 2006-984 (La.App. 3 Cir.
12/6/06).

32
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prescription of nonuse. . . .." Here there was no silence. Another aspect
of the case that is inaccurate pertains to the rules of prescription.
Although the court is on firm ground in treating the mineral right as the
reservation of a servitude rather than as a mineral royalty, the court does
so by looking to extrinsic evidence rather than the words of the
reservation itself. But it then goes on to state that the "rules of
prescription are the same for both a mineral servitude and a mineral
royalty," citing as its authority Article 103 of the Mineral Code. This is
only partly true, for Article 103 only makes Articles 72 through 75
applicable to mineral royalties. There is a big difference between
interruption of prescription for mineral servitudes-which can be
accomplished by good faith efforts to find oil and gas (such as a dry
hole)-and interruption of prescription for mineral royalties, which
requires actual production (Article 87). This potentially was important in
this case for it appears that the drilling of the well that interrupted ten
years prescription was commenced on March 5 and ten years were up on
June 22 of the same year; if production was not achieved (and the court
does not state when it was first obtained) before June 22, then the right
would have been extinguished if it were classified as a mineral royalty.
As I have stated, the court's characterization of the right as a mineral
servitude was correct but its statement about the rules of prescription
being the same can lead to misunderstanding in the future.
St. Mary Operating Co. v. Guidry (La.App. 3 Cir.)
954 So.2d 397, 2006-1495 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/4/07)

A similar analysis and result obtained in St. Mary Operating Co. v.
Guidry." St. Mary Operating Company'filed a concursus proceeding in
order to determine to whom it should pay the proceeds of an oil well.
The parties had executed an act of "Co-Mingling and Exchange"
recorded April 4, 1997, which provided: "All of the parties hereto agree
that this exchange of minerals, which creates a mineral servitude, will
last a period of seven (7) years from the date of recordation of this
instrument . . ." One group was made up landowners who asserted that a
deed reserving mineral rights had created a right subject to a fixed term
of seven years. The mineral owners claimed that the seven year period
specified in the deed merely invoked an initially shortened regime of
prescription and that the rights could be preserved by actions that
interrupted prescription. Relying on parole evidence as to intent, the trial
court ruled that the "co-mingling and exchange" act created a mineral
servitude subject to a prescriptive period of seven years and not a
servitude for a fixed term of seven years. The landowners appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The instrument created a mineral servitude

3

St. Mary Operating Co. v. Guidry, 954 So.2d 397, 2006-1495 (La.App. 3 Cir.

4/4/07).
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subject to a prescriptive period of seven years and not a servitude for a
fixed term of seven years.
VI. Miscellaneous Cases
A. Hurricane Effects
Cannisnia Plantation, L.L.C. v. American Energy Holdings,
L.L.C. (La.App. 2 Cir.)
947 So.2d 235, 42,170 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/25/07)
Just after Hurricane Katrina, Governor Blanco, at the request of the
Louisiana State Bar Association, the Louisiana Trial Lawyers
Association, and the Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel, issued
on September 6, 2005, Executive Order No. KBB 2005-32. It was
amended and extended by Executive Order No. KBB 2005-48, issued on
September 23, 2005, and again by Executive Order No. KBB 2005-67,
issued on Octcber 19, 2005 to take into consideration the impact of
Hurricane Rita. The purpose was to suspend all deadlines applicable to
legal proceedings, including prescription and peremption, in all
Louisiana state courts, administrative agencies and boards. The
suspensions were to continue "until at least Friday, November 25, 2005."
The proceedings in Cannisnia Plantation, L.L.C. v. American Energy
Holdings, L.L. C.,34 concern the effects on the running of mineral
prescription of these executive orders. The trial court granted a partial
motion for summary judgment, finding that none of the Governor's
executive orders operated to interrupt, suspend, or otherwise toll the
running of prescription of nonuse. On appeal, the court said that the issue
of the effect of the orders on..the prescription of nonuse was intertwined
with the remaining issues regarding whether and when the defendants
conducted operations sufficient to interrupt that prescription. The court
noted: "even if the prescription of nonuse was suspended until November
25, 2005, as alleged by the defendants, they would still have had to
conduct prescription-interrupting operations within the two to six weeks
following November 25, 2005, to prevent the extinction of the mineral
servitude." The motion to dismiss the appeals was granted.
Rathborne Land Co. LLC v. Ascent Energy, Inc. (E.D.La.)
2007 WL 101057, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1682 (E.D.La.)
Plaintiff lessor sought to cancel the lease at issue for lessee's failure
to produce in paying quantities for a period in excess of 35 months. The
lease, however, could be continued by reworking operations as well as
production. The court here denies plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment as there was a disputed issue of material fact whether
defendant maintained the lease by conducting reworking operations.

3

Cannisnia Piantation,L.L.C. v. American Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 947 So.2d 235,

42,170 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/25/07)
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Moreover, defendant asserted that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita impeded
its operations, and the force majeure clause had thus come into play.
B. Federal Government Matters
Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. U. S. (C.A.5 (La.))
2007 WL 715270, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 5233 (C.A.5 (La.)) (case
was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) - writ
denied, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2303.
By Act 315 of 1940, La. R.S. 9:5806, minerals or royalties reserved
upon conveyance of land to the United States or one of its agencies or
subdivisions were made imprescriptible. Retroactive operation of this
statute was long in dispute but was finally settled in 1973 in United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 35 denying retrospective
operation to the act. Prior to Little Lake Misere, the Louisiana court in
Whitney National Bank v. Little Creek Oil Co.,1 6 held the act to be
retrospectively applicable. It was held constitutional in United States v.
Nebo Oil Co. Certain parts of the servitudes involved in Nebo Oil Co.
(which held that Act 315 of 1940 could be applied effectively to lands
acquired by the United States) were the subject of litigation in PetroHunt, L.L. C. v. UnitedStates.38 Although the district court found that res
judicata effect should be given to Nebo Oil, the appellate court reversed,
ruling that resjudicataand collateral estoppel did not apply because the
United States raised issues that were not identical to the issues litigated
in Nebo Oil and there had been a change in controlling legal principles. 39
The case reported here is over whether on remand the district court
properly limited the scope of the remand. The appeals court holds that it
did.
U.S. v. Burlington Resources Oil and Gas Co. L.P. (W.D.La.)
2007 WL 773716 (W.D.La.) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d)
The United States filed a claim under the Oil Pollution Act 0 to
recover the cost of clean-up of an oil production pit and the surrounding
area. Defendants included the owners of the mineral servitude on the
property whose predecessor at one time owned both land and minerals.
The magistrate judge ruled in US. v. Burlington Resources Oil and Gas
Co. L.P. that the servitude owners are not a "responsible party" under the

United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
Whitney National Bank v. Little Creek Oil Co., 212 La. 949, 33 So. 2d 693 (1947).
3
United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951).
3
Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2004) , rev'g 179 F.
Supp. 2d 669, (W.D. La. 2001).
3
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); Central Pines
Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 2001).
"

36

40

33 U.S.C. § 2701 et. seq.
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Oil Pollution Act as they were not the operator nor the "owner" of the
pit.
Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. v. Allred (W.D.La.)
2007 WL 3231634 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83424.
In Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. v. Allred, an oil and gas company
brought an action against the Department of the Interior seeking
declaratory relief and an injunction challenging a decision by the agency
to subject several mandatory royalty relief leases to require royalty
payments if certain price thresholds were met regardless of whether the
leases produced thii minimum amount of royalty free production.
The court rejected the agency's argument that royalty relief leases
under the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act and the Deep Water Royalty
Relief Act 4 ' are subject to price threshold exceptions before the
minimum amount of royalty free production was obtained, finding that
the agency failed to meet step one of the Chevron deference test because
its interpretation contradicted the plain, unambiguous language of the
statute. The court also refused to consider the agency's affirmative
contractual defenses because such defenses are not available when the
government makes a contract contrary to law.
C. State Lands
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State (La.App. 4 Cir.)
972 So.2d 363, 2007-0673 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/21/07).
By acts of 1394 and 1938, the State conveyed certain lands to the
Buras Levee Dist-ict. This entity granted a mineral lease to a company,
and Chevron is the sublessee of a successor in interest. The lease covered
multiple tracts, one known as Tract 87 and another as Tract 1. A title
question was raised as to whether the State or the successor to the levee
district had the rights to the minerals under Tract 87. In that litigation the
State asserted that Act No. 443 of 1954 rescinded all transfers, of
navigable waters and their beds to any levee district.43 The court there
ruled that under the Mineral Code mineral rights are real rights, and the
lease granted by the levee district in 1938 was a contract which could not
be impaired by sibsequent legislation." The Parish granted a mineral
lease on lands that later became water bottoms. Although the State
became owner of the water bottoms, the mineral rights are retained by
the Parish as long as its lease granted in 1938 is in effect under a statute,
La. R.S. 9:1.152. Evidently the State thought there was something
41
42

4:1

Codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1337.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
La. R.S. 9:1101.

4
PlaqueminesPa-ish Government v. State, La. App. 2001-1027, 826 So. 2d 14 (La.
Ct. App. 2002), writ denied, La. 2002-1304, 824 So. 2d 1170 (La. 2002).
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different about the features of Tract I that would cause the court to treat
it differently from Tract 87, which was under the same lease. So, when
Chevron sought confirmation from the State that it would not contest the
validity of the lease or the ownership of the minerals produced by
Chevron from Tract 1, the State refused to provide such assurance and
advised Chevron that it considered Tract I as unleased property
belonging to the State. Chevron filed suit then to sort out title. The court
in Chevron US.A., Inc. v. State,45 concluded that the prior litigation was
over the lease, not the tract. Under newer Louisiana rules of resjudicata,
re-litigation of the issues was foreclosed.46
Sanders v. State (La.App. 3 Cir.)
973 So.2d 879, 2007-821 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/19/07).
In Sanders v. State,47 a plaintiff brought a claim against the State for
a declaration that he was the owner of certain land surrounding a lake
because the high water mark, below which the land is owned by the
State, had lessened. After a battle of the experts the court sided with the
State, finding that the high water mark had not changed.
D. Two Final cases
Mayne & Mertz, Inc. v. Quest Exploration, LLC (W.D.La.)
2007 WL 2900510 (W.D.La.); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74471.
In Mayne & Mertz, Inc. v. Quest Exploration, LLC, an oil and gas
company, M &M, brought a claim against a rival oil and gas company
and a landowner for misappropriation of seismic data protected by a
confidentiality agreement between the landowner and M & M. The
landowner and rival company moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that M & M could not prove damages to the requisite degree of
certainty. The court found expert testimony on behalf of M & M
regarding the percentage of completions for similar wells in the prospect
area, using the same seismic data, sufficient to defeat the rival
company's motion.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 972 So.2d 363, 2007-0673 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/21/07).
4
The court indicated that the prior legislation established that a decided case
precluded a second suit only if the second suit involved the same parties, the same cause,
and the same object of demand as the prior suit. The confusion surrounding res judicata
prior to the 1990 amendment concerned whether there was an "identity of cause." After
the 1990 amendment to the res judicata statute, the chief inquiry is whether the second
action asserts a cause of action which arises out of the transaction or occurrence that was
the subject matter of the first action. See Burguieres v. Pollingue,02-1385 (La.2/25/03),
843 So.2d 1049.
4
Sanders v. State, 973 So.2d 879, 2007-821 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/19/07).
4s
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Martin: Recent Developments

Roton v. Vernon E. Faulconer, Inc. (La.App. 2 Cir.)
966 So.2d 790, 42,452 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/3/07).
In Roton v. Vernon E.Y Fauilconer, Inc.," the parents of a minor
brought an action in tort to recover damages resulting from the child's
death after the 15 year-old trespassed on the defendant's pumping unit.
The court held that the operator was not responsible for the death of the
minor because it was entitled to the protection of La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
9:2800.4, which requires a plaintiff to show gross negligence or intent to
recover from an oil and gas owner. The unit was 208 feet from a nearby
road; it was equipped with a three rail guardrail; and there were several
warning signs on the guardrail. These measures were calculated to alert
potential trespassors to stay away from the unit and did not amount to
gross negligence cr an intentional act.

Roton v. Vernor, E. Faulconer, Inc., 966 So.2d 790, 42,452 (La.App. 2 Cir.
10/3/07).
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